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Growth is Good for Whom, When, How? 
“It should come as no surprise that the general relationship between growth of income of 
the poor and growth of mean income is one-to-one.” (Dollar and Kraay 2000, p. 28) 
 
I. Introduction 
Economic growth often helps the poor, but what about the many cases when it does not? The 
consensus that economic growth reduces poverty, encapsulated by two World Bank economists in the 
above-quoted article entitled “Growth is Good for the Poor,” leaves many important questions 
unanswered. What help does the knowledge that economic growth can reduce poverty provide for 
economies with few realistic prospects for robust, sustained growth? What hope does the understanding 
that growth reduces poverty “on average” provide for poor families that are excluded from prosperity? 
How should we respond when economic growth undermines the market positions of the poor, becoming 
what Jagdish Bhagwati calls “immiserizing growth”? What advice emerges from the linkage between 
economic growth and poverty reduction for those who hope to make growth even better for the poor? 
With regard to these vital issues, observations based on aggregated data concerning economic growth’s 
connection to poverty reduction contribute little. Instead, much can be learned from disaggregating the 
data and examining cases that defy this relationship, as well as those in which countries did especially 
well in increasing the income of the poor.  
Among the research on the connection between economic growth and poverty reduction, David 
Dollar and Aart Kraay’s article is notable for its analysis of an extensive dataset that reflects the 
experience of hundreds of countries over the past few decades. Using this same dataset, we can study 
exceptions to the hypothesized link between economic growth and poverty reduction, as well as the cases 
in which income of the poor increased the most, in order to seek alternative paths to poverty reduction. 
This approach indirectly counters Dollar and Kraay’s two primary conclusions. They argue first that, for 
the countries in their extensive sample, economic growth explains nearly half of the changes in the 
income of the poor. This relationship is both one-to-one and consistent across different regions, over   2
different time periods, and for both boom and bust cycles.
i This paper responds not by challenging this 
conclusion directly, but by identifying and analyzing “exceptional cases” – those cases within the same 
dataset that defy the relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction. In doing so, insights 
emerge regarding ways to reduce poverty beyond what economic growth might otherwise allow, as well 
as which mechanisms prevent economic growth from reaching the poor. Second, the authors argue that 
policies consistent with a liberal agenda (i.e., stable inflation rates, rule of law, financial development, 
reduced government consumption and increased trade openness) best produce economic growth without 
negatively affecting distribution, while other factors, such as education and formal democratic 
institutions, have little or no systematic relationship with the income of the poor. This paper challenges 
this conclusion by examining the extent to which “extreme cases” – those countries in the dataset that saw 
the greatest increases in the income of the poor – actually achieved economic growth through generally 
liberal prescriptions. Perhaps economic growth can be achieved through alternate means.  
This paper is a departure from the approach of other scholars who criticize Dollar and Kraay’s study 
directly on methodological and theoretical grounds (e.g., Danielson 2001; Eastwood and Lipton 2001; 
Kakwani and Pernia 2000; Lubker et al. 2002; Ravallion 2001; Rozelle et al. 2003; Rodrik 2000; 
Weisbrot et al. 2000; White and Anderson 2001). By contrast, this research does not contest the overall, 
general relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction,
ii arguing instead that there are 
multiple pathways to poverty reduction, of which Dollar and Kraay identify but one – economic growth 
spurred by liberal policies. As many have pointed out (e.g., George and Bennett 2005; Goertz 2005), 
aggregate statistics cannot identify the diverse ways in which countries have successfully (and 
unsuccessfully) attacked poverty. Instead, careful qualitative research is more effective in identifying 
alternative pathways. Else Øyen’s argument, nearly a decade old, applies equally today:  
“Up-to-date data are necessary to ensure that the poor and the intensity of poverty are 
kept visible to the public eye, but it may still be wise to put somewhat less energy into 
sheer measurement research, and instead turn to issues that yield more in poverty 
understanding.” (Øyen 1996, p. 10)   3
Dollar and Kraay’s dataset, also adopted in this research, is compiled from four different sources to 
produce 953 observations from 137 different countries or territories between 1950 and 1999. To make the 
data more balanced and evenly distributed across countries, Dollar and Kraay filter the data by choosing 
dates from each country that are spaced five years apart starting with the year available, resulting in 418 
country-year observations of mean income of the poor. For their regression analysis, the authors further 
limit the sample to 258 observations from 92 countries with at least two observations, spaced five years 
apart.
iii While Dollar and Kraay attempt to adjust to the difficulties in comparing surveys across counties, 
such as differing coverage, measures and units between observations, critics argue that this dataset has 
numerous additional problems.
iv Nevertheless, I use the same data to pursue the goal of exploring what 
we can learn from exceptions to their research. Although some data problems can be exacerbated when 
shifting from aggregate data to individual cases,
v such issues are also easier to identify through the closer 
scrutiny that qualitative analysis affords. 
II. Methodology and Objectives 
Dollar and Kraay, in performing an OLS regression analysis of economic growth against poverty 
reduction, find an R
2 of 0.49 and a regression line with a slope of 1.19 (Figure 1). In spite of these results, 
the authors realize (notwithstanding their uncompromising title) that they cannot claim that poverty rates 
vary lockstep with changes in the economy, cautioning,  
“Our findings do not imply that growth is all that is needed to improve the lives of the 
poor. Rather, we simply emphasize that growth on average does benefit the poor as much 
as anyone else in society, and so standard growth-enhancing policies should be at the 
center of any effective poverty reduction strategy.” (Dollar and Kraay 2002, p. 219) 
Dollar and Kraay’s sample contains much more variation than the R
2 measure implies. In fact, more 
than one in six of the authors’ 285 historical cases violate the expectation that positive income growth 
improves the income of the poor (in 45 cases, incomes of the poor declined while GDP increased) and its 
correlate that negative income growth will reduce the incomes of the poor (six cases saw the income of 
the poor increase despite negative GDP growth). Moreover, numerous data points lie far enough away   4
from the regression line that they are statistically likely to be exceptional cases, ones in which the increase 
in the income of the poor is statistically unlikely to be explained by economic growth alone.  
I determine the exceptions to this regression by computing the residuals, the vertical distance 
between the regression line and each data point, and then calculating the probability that the distance is 
due to random variation. Each point on the X-axis of the regression line corresponds to a bell-shaped 
curve that indicates the chance that any given data point is random. This bell curve has its modal value 
over the X-axis and extends in both directions along the Y-axis (Figure 2). For example, a point (such as 
point “A” on Figure 2) that is positioned directly on the regression line is likely to be explained by the 
independent variables. If the point is a modest distance (such as point “B”) from the regression line, it 
remains likely that the explanatory factors account for that point, though this likelihood decreases as the 
distance from the regression line increases. For a case far away from the regression line (such as point 
“C”), the likelihood becomes low.  
In this case, we will calculate the chance that changes in GDP explain changes in the income of the 
poor for each point in Dollar and Kraay’s dataset.
vi When this probability drops below five percent in 
either direction (equivalent to a 90 percent confidence interval), I label that point an exception. This 
process generates two types of exceptions: a) cases in which the increase in the income of the poor 
significantly outpaces expectations based on economic growth (“positive exceptions,” i.e., positive from 
the point of view of poverty reduction), and b) cases in which the increase in the income of the poor was 
much less than the expectations based on economic growth (“negative exceptions”). Specifically, I 
subtract the change in poverty rates predicted by the model (column 4 in Table 1 below) from the value 
reported by the data (column 5). This “residual” value is recorded in column 6. Column 7 (labeled 
“outlier”) records the probability that the position of each case’s corresponding value for income of the 
lowest quintile is caused by random variation. This is estimated by calculating the “P” values of the 
residual’s “Z” scores to determine the chance that the point’s distance from the regression line is caused 
by random factors. The cases with an outlier score higher or lower than five percent are listed in the table.    5
For instance, in the five-year period between 1962 and 1971, Finland experienced an annual growth 
rate of 3.99 percent, according to Dollar and Kraay’s data. Although this would predict that income of the 
poorest quintile should have increased 4.05 percent, the actual increase in income of the poor over this 
period, according to the data, was 14.6 percent, exceeding model’s prediction by 10.56 percentage points. 
Since the likelihood that this data point can be explained by random error is approximately 0.38 percent, 
Finland is considered a positive exception, unexplained by Dollar and Kraay’s model. In contrast, the 
economy of China between 1990 and 1995 grew at an annual pace of 8.7 percent. However, although the 
model predicts that the growth rate in the income of the bottom quintile would exceed 9.6 percent, the 
income of that group grew by 0.87 percent per annum. The chance that this data point is explained by 
random error is approximately 1.3 percent, meaning China qualifies as a negative exception. 
If the data are correct and the model is accurate, 27 of Dollar and Kraay’s 285 cases can be 
considered likely exceptions. In the 13 positive exceptions, the income of approximately 33.5 million 
poor people grew faster than the model’s predicted rate by an average of 9.1 percentage points. Some 341 
million poor people (101 million, excluding the case of China) in the 14 negative exceptions saw their 
incomes rise by an average of 8.5 percentage points less than the model predicted.
vii Perhaps in these 
exceptional cases, particular political, social or economic factors intruded to disrupt the causal connection 
between economic growth and poverty reduction. A complete analysis of each of the cases is an 
ambitious project, requiring greater time, space and specific area knowledge than is afforded here. 
Nevertheless, an initial examination reveals that these exceptional cases represent a diverse range 
approaches to poverty reduction and economic growth. The goal of this paper is not so much to analyze 
the situations in these countries fully, but to note that even a cursory examination of these cases reveals 
that they achieved these results by traversing a variety of paths and using an assortment of mechanisms. 
While none of these paths is new, they nevertheless serve as a counterpoint to Dollar and Kraay’s 
conclusions about the importance of economic growth and using a liberal set of policies to achieve 
poverty reduction.   6
III. Examining Exceptional Cases 
Three of the positive exceptions are Scandinavian social democracies with broad-based social 
programs designed to minimize poverty rates (Gustafsson and Pedersen 2000). While Norway’s economy 
grew relatively slowly between 1979 and 1984 (2.8 percent each year) and again between 1989 and 1995 
(per capita GDP shrank 0.2 percent on average each year), the income of the poorest quintile grew 
rapidly, increasing 14.6 percent and 9.6 percent on average each year over those periods, respectively. 
Similarly, the per capita GDP of Finland grew on average nearly four percent each year between 1962 and 
1971, while the income of the bottom quintile increased 14.6 percent on average each year over that 
period. While these countries, importantly, boasted developed economies with the resources needed to 
sustain generous social programs, the poverty reduction achieved in each of these cases is exceptional. 
Even as these social democracies maintained broadly targeted programs to ensure the distribution of 
wealth throughout these societies, one positive exception reduced poverty through newly established, 
narrowly targeted social safety nets. During the oft-derided presidency of President Giscard d’Estaing, the 
growth in income of the poorest quintile in France outpaced economic growth to such an extent that the 
country qualifies as a positive exception. During this period Giscard, arguing that France would “never be 
at ease with herself until all the old inequalities had been removed,” established no fewer than seven 
benefit programs targeting the poor (Levy 1999). Partially as a result, the income of the bottom quintile 
rose by an average of nine percent each year, in spite of the country’s moribund overall economic 
performance of 2.2 percent each year between 1977 and 1982, caused in large part by economic problems 
from an oil crisis and skyrocketing prices of raw materials. 
A number of positive exceptions from the developing world achieved poverty reduction through land 
reform and other distributive policies. Colombia (1964-1970) is one case in which land reform appears to 
have increased the income of the poor, at least during the presidency of Carlos Lleras Restrepo (1966-
1970). Between 1968-69 alone, some 60,000 land titles involving 2.5 million hectares were issued to 
peasants and unemployed workers (Findlay 1972).
viii Dollar and Kraay’s raw data supports this view, 
reporting that the Gini index for income in Colombia declined from .62 to .52 between 1964 and 1970   7
(although the Gini index rose again from .51 to .57 between 1991 and 1995 once land reform was 
reversed). Thus, during a period in Colombia which included several years of land reform (1964-1970), 
land reform seems to be a primary cause behind the income growth of the poor, which averaged 17 
percent each year despite a relatively modest annual economic growth of 2.3 percent.
 ix  
Redistributive policies are also likely to be responsible for the exceptional income growth of the 
poorest quintile in some of the other exceptional Latin American cases. For instance, the term of Peru’s 
discredited President Juan Velasco Alvarado was characterized by nationalization of the petroleum and 
other industries, as well as ambitious land reform policies (McClintock 1981). Although Peru’s economy 
stagnated between 1971 and 1981, growing less than one percent on average, the income of the poor in 
Peru increased by more than eight percent per year over that time as peasants benefited from land reform 
and other redistributive policies. El Salvador experienced a similar period (1989-1995), with the income 
of the poorest quintile increasing 9.5 percent on average, despite relatively modest annual average 
economic growth of nearly 2.6 percent. The peace accords signed in January 1992, ending the civil war in 
that country, coincided with policies designed to address staggering inequality through land transfers, 
support for establishing microenterprises and housing assistance, as well as broadened poverty alleviation 
programs intended to reintegrate combatants into civilian life (Boyce 1995). These progressive 
redistributive programs, along with remittances from overseas relatives
x and a period of relative peace 
and stability, helped to make El Salvador a positive exception.  
By contrast, at least two of the positive exceptions in Latin America were led by right-wing 
governments that implemented structural reforms, indicating that liberal prescriptions are indeed a path 
that helped some countries become positive exceptions.
xi First, Rodrigo Alberto Carazo Odio, Costa 
Rica’s conservative president between 1978 and 1982, faced an emerging debt crisis and rapidly 
increasing inflation rates. In response, he implemented IMF-mandated reforms and policies, with mixed 
results. Between 1977 and 1982, Costa Rica’s economy shrank more than three percent each year on 
average, increasing unemployment. Nevertheless, the two percent increase in the income of the poor 
outpaced the annual four percent decline in income that the model predicts.
xii Second, Chile’s General   8
Augusto Pinochet based his economic policies on market-oriented reforms under the slogan of making 
Chile “not a nation of proletarians, but a nation of entrepreneurs.” While a number of initiatives to help 
the poor were implemented in the early 1980s, when extremely poor rural families were for the first time 
assisted directly by social welfare policies, and a brief employment policy was implemented in the mid-
1980s (phased out by 1988), the latter parts of Pinochet’s reign (1974-1990) focused primarily on the 
implementation of liberal policies. By in the mid-1980s, Pinochet, dissatisfied with the country’s 
economic performance, turned to classical economists who helped guide Chile’s economic policies 
through an automatic adjustment strategy. The policies, consistent with a pro-market, liberal approach, 
called for active macroeconomic management, consolidation of the market-oriented structural reforms 
from the 1970s, and debt management and restructuring of debt payments (Hudson 1994). Moreover, 
despite intentions to break from the abuses of the Pinochet’s regime and to provide more equitable 
policies, the first several post-Pinochet governments continued these policies, including the Aylwin 
administration that succeeded Pinochet’s (Taylor 2004; Murray 2002). Despite Pinochet’s abhorrent 
human rights record, between 1987 and 1992, during the last part of the Pinochet and early part of the 
Aylwin administrations, Chile became a positive exception, during which the income of the poor 
increased 13.3 percent, dwarfing the pace of Chile’s already impressive economic growth rate of 5.1 
percent per year.  
Just as countries have traversed a variety of paths to become positive exceptions, so too have some 
countries become negative exceptions due to a variety of causes. The most common of these in the sample 
did so through implementing rapid liberalization reform programs. The “shock therapy” policies 
implemented in the wake of Communism’s collapse and the subsequent privatization policies of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union sparked economic recessions that hit the poor especially hard (Bunce 
1999). The gross domestic products of Bulgaria (1989-1994), Estonia (1988-1993) and Ukraine (1988-
1995) declined annually by an average of 4.9 percent, 8.4 percent and 11 percent, respectively. However, 
over this period, the income of the poor fell far more than expected, declining each year by an average of 
16.3 percent, 18.4 percent and 20.2 percent, respectively. Russia’s experience (1989-1993) is especially   9
dramatic. While the Russian economy contracted as per capita GDP declined 6.4 percent each year on 
average, the income of the poor declined 20.9 each year, as workers were retrenched, inefficient factories 
were closed, the agricultural sector weakened and economic protections were dismantled. Overall, these 
Eastern European countries implemented sudden transitions from planned to market-based economies, 
including the removal of price supports, elimination of subsidies from state-owned enterprises, 
liberalization of foreign trade and slashing of government expenditures (Derleth 2000) – especially-rapid 
versions of liberal reforms. However, without economic and political institutions to moderate the effects 
of these sudden shifts, the economy collapsed. Productivity in all of the countries that implemented shock 
therapy plummeted, with the poor suffering more than every other group in many countries (World Bank 
2000). Poland, despite being the only post-socialist state to achieve a positive average GDP growth rate 
between 1990 and 1997 (Bunce 1999) and the only European post-socialist economy to surpass its pre-
transition GDP within six years of the transition (Derleth 2000), is considered a model for post-
Communist reform.
xiii Nevertheless, Poland’s post-socialist experience still qualifies as a negative 
exception, as shock therapy was especially harsh on the poor, whose income declined by an average of 
2.7 percent each year between 1991 and 1996, indicating that this country’s record during its early reform 
period may be less laudable is commonly asserted.
xiv  
At least two other countries became negative exceptions through rolling back progressive social 
policies. Colombia between 1970 and 1978, directly after the period in which the country was a positive 
exception, became a negative exception. During this period, the government rolled back land reform and 
implemented market-oriented policies, including increasing openness, incentives designed to attract 
foreign capital and elimination of barriers to free investment in the countryside (Molano 2000). The 
government’s cancellation of land reform in 1971 and the subsequent introduction of new crop varieties 
during the green revolution exacerbated the already inequitable distribution of land (Findlay 1972; 
Puyana 2000). Ironically, though this is considered a time of economic recovery, with annual per capita 
GDP growth in Colombia increasing during this period by 3.3 percent on average, the income of the poor 
concurrently declined annually by an average of 4.8 percent.    10
Like Colombia, China rolled back key initiatives that were important to raising rural poor incomes. 
That China is a negative exception is surprising, since the country is often cited as a typical case in which 
economic growth directly contributed to poverty reduction (e.g., Rozelle et al. 2003; World Bank 2001). 
Although economic growth has increased steadily and the rural poverty rate declined sharply in China 
since the beginning of the 1978 post-Mao era, the direct link between economic growth and poverty 
reduction over some periods is less clear. While China’s economic growth between 1978 and 1984 led to 
unprecedented windfalls for the rural poor in most areas, in the early 1990s the pace of rural poverty 
reduction slowed despite continuing rapid economic growth. One key reason was the shift from reforming 
the rural economy to stimulating urban development, while slashing prices for agricultural goods 
purchased under government quotas (e.g., Park and Wang 2001). According to Dollar and Kraay’s data, 
economic growth in China between 1990 and 1995 increased by an average of 8.7 percent, even as the 
income of the poor increased on average less than one percent each year.
xv 
In contrast, Brazil became a negative exception primarily because of debt and corruption. The 
country’s economic downturn of 1986-1993, a period of mounting debt and rampant corruption was 
inaugurated by the Sarnay administration’s misguided and overly punitive 1986 policy of price and wage 
control followed by a 1987 moratorium on foreign debt payments that isolated Brazil, weakening foreign 
credit and investment. In 1990, its first year in office, the succeeding Collor presidency implemented far-
reaching economic reforms, including deepening price and wage freezes, confiscating savings and 
deindexing the economy, which succeeded in curbing inflation while slashing real incomes (Roett 1999, 
pp. 14-15). The policies implemented during these two presidencies caused far more pain to the poorest 
quintile (the income of the poor declined 10.6 percent each year) than to the economy as a whole, 
according to the data. Abuses of the state hamstrung national development (per capita GDP dropped less 
than one percent each year over that period), although the poor, whose income declined 10.6 percent per 
year, fared worse than the population as a whole.  
Chaos and violent disruption was the direct cause of at least one other negative exception. The 
economic losses to the poor when death squads terrorized El Salvador compounded the general misery of   11
this period. Much of the period of the “death squads,” which began with the right-wing military 
government seizing power in 1979 and ended with peace accords in 1992 (Boyce 1995), overlaps with the 
1977-89 period in which the income of the poor shrank 9.3 percent per year, compared to the annual 
decline in per capita GDP of 1.7 percent. Subsequently, as we have seen, the country’s recovery qualified 
it as a positive exception. 
That Singapore is also a negative exception is surprising, given that the country’s relatively broad-
based housing and primary education policies were intended in part to moderate poverty. Nevertheless, 
between 1978 and 1983, when per capita economic growth averaged 5.8 percent per year, the income of 
the lowest 20 percent declined 1.3 percent on average each year. During this period, the government 
intentionally transformed the economy to be more human and physical capital-intensive, encouraging the 
automation of processes previously done by non-skilled or semi-skilled physical labor (Chow et al. 1988, 
p. 178; Peebles and Wilson 1996, p. 37). Since public assistance for the poor in Singapore is highly 
restricted, families avoid poverty mainly through employment (Lee 2001). During this period, economic 
growth remained moderately strong, but those with insufficient human capital to meet new demands from 
the service sector apparently lost income (Chow et al. 1988). As is discussed in the next section, however, 
the relative losses for the bottom quintile in Singapore between 1978 and 1983 are sandwiched between 
two periods (1973-1978 and 1983-1988) in which Singapore achieved one of the most impressive 
increases in the income of the poor that can be found in Dollar and Kraay’s dataset.
xvi Nevertheless, 
during this five-year period, as the government navigated a large-scale change in industrial structure 
designed to keep Singapore’s economy competitive, lower-skilled workers lost income. 
Focusing on exceptional countries can sometimes identify two comparable countries that are 
relatively similar in many respects, but are on opposite ends of the spectrum. Examining these naturally 
controlled cases allows us to focus on contrasting policies and other social features that might cause the 
differences. This sample contains two neighboring African countries, one a positive exception, the other a 
negative one. Paradoxically, during a period of communal violence and a border war with neighboring 
Senegal (1989-1991), the income of the poor in Mauritania increased 9.7 percent each year on average   12
between 1988 and 1993, even as per capita GDP increased by an average of a mere 1.7 percent per 
annum, according to the data. Could the increase in the income of the poor be explained by a return to 
stability in the wake of recovery from repeated droughts in the 1980s and the cessation of hostilities with 
neighboring Senegal (Coulombe and McKay 1996)? Mali, Mauritania’s neighbor, is also an exception, 
but a negative one. The country’s economic recession – per capita GDP declined 2.6 percent on average 
each year between 1989 and 1994 – was especially harsh to the country’s poor, whose income declined 
11.4 percent annually over that period. While economic growth recovered in the mid-1990s, reaching 7.4 
percent in 1995, even as late as the middle of the present decade, an estimated 175,000 Mali children 
remain undernourished (United Nations World Food Programme 2005).  
The contrasting experiences of these two analogous countries over similar time periods make them 
ripe for comparison across a range of issues, including democratization and structural adjustment. In the 
cases of Mali and Mauritania, democratization is not a likely cause, because it appears to have been 
weaker in Mauritania than it was in Mali, opposite of the expected pattern. Whereas both countries 
established democratic institutions in 1992 and democracy was shaky in both countries, Mali’s president 
Alpha Oumar Konaré successfully completed (despite rampant corruption and vote boycotting) two full 
constitutionally-limited terms between 1992 and 2002. In contrast, Mauritania’s incumbent president 
Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya’s election in 1992 was widely regarded as illegitimate, and his regime, 
especially unpopular, was eventually toppled in a bloodless coup in August 2005, reportedly delighting 
crowds. Thus, democratization was apparently weaker in the positive exception than it was in the negative 
one. A more likely explanation is the effect of structural adjustment. Structural adjustment is not an 
explanation for Mauritania’s performance, since the country did not accede to a structural adjustment 
program until 1999, well after the time period in which it was a positive exception. On the other hand, 
Mali implemented a stringent and controversial IMF program that overlapped with the period in question. 
Under IMF conditions, Mali slashed government employment, sold state assets, increased taxes and 
enhanced control over import and export duties. The sudden and steep devaluation of the local currency 
made it more difficult and expensive for urbanites – the poor especially – to purchase food (Toulmin et al.   13
2000). While structural adjustment is unlikely to be the sole factor explaining Mali as a negative 
exception, it likely contributed to the country’s qualifications as a negative exception.  
 IV. Analyzing Extreme Cases 
Unlike analyzing exceptional cases, which primarily addresses the link between economic growth 
and poverty reduction, examining “extreme cases” – those cases (whether exceptional or not) that 
performed best in terms of increasing income of the poor
xvii – can raise questions about both of Dollar and 
Kraay’s primary conclusions: that economic growth effectively reduces poverty and that liberal economic 
policies are the best way to achieve growth. That 12 positive exceptions (all except Costa Rica) represent 
nearly half of the sample’s 25 leading extreme cases is inconsistent with the conclusion that economic 
growth is critical for income growth of the poor. That such a high proportion of these leading cases of 
poverty reduction cannot be explained by economic growth indicates that cases within the database itself 
suggest there are ways other than economic growth to achieve poverty reduction. Although the majority 
of these 12 cases had positive economic growth, the increase in the income of the poor significantly 
outpaced the extent of economic growth that could be anticipated using an explanation of economic 
growth alone, as analyzed in the section above. Analyzing the non-exceptional extreme cases is also a 
way to explore how pro-poor economic growth is best achieved (see Table 2). Many advocates of liberal 
reforms assert that strategies focusing on reducing the size, role and expense of government, establishing 
and open, market-based economy and minimizing inflation should be especially successful at increasing 
economic growth that is particularly good for the poor. If so, many or most of the other 13 extreme cases 
that are not exceptions (i.e., those cases in which economic growth contributes to explaining poverty 
reduction) should have achieved this result entirely or primarily through liberal policies. However, while 
some cases are consistent with this expectation, most other cases achieved this result through other 
strategies.  
Six of the cases in which economic growth was generally associated with rapid poverty reduction are 
from five “Asian miracle” countries and territories, including Korea (over two periods), Japan, Singapore, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. However, these countries implemented economic strategies that involved a mix   14
of market forces and strong, active state intervention. While some scholars argue that these countries 
featured modest government roles, the consensus is that each of these economies, with the exception of 
Hong Kong, relied heavily on state-led growth and development, and did not even approximate typical 
cases of liberal economic policy (e.g., Johnson 1982; Amsden 1985; Huff 1999; Wade 1993).  
Trinidad and Tobago (1976-1981) and Gabon (1960-1975) are both highly dependent on oil for their 
economic growth. Trinidad and Tobago’s economy received a boost from an oil boom in 1974, with its 
economy peaking in 1983 – a period that is similar to the period in which the income growth of the 
country’s poor ranked 16th among Dollar and Kraay’s sample. Gabon’s discovery of oil and subsequent 
oil boom in the 1970s supported two decades of economic growth, which averaged 9.5 percent each year, 
making Gabon one of sub-Saharan Africa’s wealthiest nations. That oil booms largely explain both cases 
is ironic, first because the oil industry is generally capital-intensive and foreign-owned and managed, 
excluding non-poor people from the majority of the job opportunities generated from the sector.
xviii 
Second, the windfalls in government finance in oil-rich countries usually benefit the non-poor, as 
government jobs and programs funded by oil revenues often favor the middle-class and higher. In 
Trinidad and Tobago’s case, employment of the low-income poor was primarily in the construction 
industry, as the government invested in the energy sector and infrastructure, and these jobs disappeared 
soon after the subsequent oil bust (IBRD 1995, p. 11). Third, the “Dutch Disease,” in which oil exports 
drive up currency exchange rates, hurting other domestic industries and sparking deindustrialization, 
should also limit employment generating opportunities in other sectors. This subsequently occurred in 
both countries, with little diversification occurring in either country. While both countries went into 
lengthy recessions during the slump in oil prices in the 1980s, hurting the poor along with the rest of the 
economy, the initial oil booms of both countries, the data suggest, sparked economic growth that 
benefited the bottom quintile of the population more than it did the rest of the population (IBRD 1995; 
World Bank 1996; Zafar 2004).  
The diverse island nation of Mauritius (population 1.2 million), which a 1972 novel described as “an 
island that everyone wants to leave” (Laville 2000, p. 277), has achieved since its independence in 1968 a   15
remarkably rapid increase in living standards. After a failed attempt to reduce the nation’s dependence on 
sugar exports through a misguided program of ISI, the nation opened its economy, establishing an export 
processing zone in 1971 and implementing between 1982 and 1986 a World Bank and IMF structural 
adjustment program. Since that time, Mauritius has focused on export-led growth and tourism to diversify 
the economy. By 1984, the export processing zone employed 70,000 workers (more than a quarter of the 
total workforce), while tourism took up an increasingly important role in the economy. While the nation’s 
government was actively involved in dulling the sharp edges of adjustment (including raising wages 14 
percent to compensate for losses in real wages due to adjustments) and establishing economy-promoting 
programs (like the export processing zone), Mauritius, like Hong Kong, is nevertheless overall consistent 
with Dollar and Kraay’s prescriptions. By opening up to exports and foreign investment while faithfully 
implementing structural adjustment programs, the country established a platform for growth, the benefits 
of which went disproportionately to the poor (Findlay and Wellisz 1993). 
V. Conclusions 
This brief survey serves as a counterpoint to two common findings in the social science literature: a) 
a robust link between economic growth and poverty reduction and b) a causal connection between liberal 
economic policies and economic growth. Thus, this article contributes to the literature countering the 
“Washington Consensus” not by directly contradicting these conclusions, but by analyzing the dataset of 
an influential article that reinforces these arguments to fill in significant blanks.  
This process does identify two exceptional cases, Costa Rica (1977-1982) and Chile (1987-1992), 
that suggest that liberal policies can increase the income of the poor without economic growth, as well as 
two extreme cases, Mauritius (1986-1991) and Hong Kong (1981-1986), that implemented liberal policies 
and not only achieved steady economic growth, but also experienced some of the most rapid increases in 
the income of the poor. In addition, this process identifies negative exceptions – which were also caused 
by a variety of factors – that include cases in which countries adopted policies consistent with the liberal 
agenda by implementing shock therapy programs, restructuring their economies or shifting away from 
progressive to regressive redistributive policies. Given the conclusions of the original article, a study of   16
both extreme and exceptional cases should discover more positive examples and fewer negative ones, 
suggesting that what is found in aggregated data does not necessarily imply common occurrences at the 
case level. That some negative exceptions were caused by violent, right-wing terror, El Salvador (1977-
1989)) and through corruption and high debt (Brazil (1986-1993)) does not take away from this mixed 
record for liberal policies. Moreover, by analyzing other positive exceptional cases, this analysis also 
demonstrates that many pathways – those that are largely inconsistent with liberal policies – effectively 
reduced poverty through means other than economic growth. Some of these positive exceptions centered 
on progressive redistribution, including Colombia (1964-1970), El Salvador (1989-1995) and Peru (1971-
1981). The case of France (1975-1981) exemplifies an approach that insulated the poor from economic 
recession through the use of social welfare policies. No fewer than three positive exceptions are 
Scandinavian social democracies. These exemplify paths to poverty reduction far different than 
prescriptions that liberal economists generally advocate. 
Similarly, most of the extreme cases are examples not of liberal states, but of developmental ones – 
governments that achieved economic growth and poverty reduction not through small government, but 
through active, state-led economic development. The resulting economic growth of these cases stimulated 
some of the highest rates of income growth for the poor. The oil endowments of other extreme cases 
(exemplified by Gabon and Trinidad and Tobago) allowed, during oil boom years, sharp increases in 
economic growth and even more impressive gains in income for the poor. The remaining two extreme 
countries, France (1962-197) and Cold War-era Bulgaria (1984-1989), also provide little additional 
support for liberal policies. While Hong Kong and Mauritius appear to reflect a liberal orientation, an 
open economy and a relatively light (though vital) role for government, these are but two of the 25 
extreme cases in Dollar and Kraay’s sample. Therefore, while a complete list of viable pathways to 
poverty reduction should include economic growth (achieved in a number of ways) and liberal economic 
policies (which have reduced poverty through growth and independently of growth), it should also 
incorporate numerous other strategies that have been used by many countries to reduce poverty (See 
Figure 3, which by no means exhausts the entire range of possible strategies).    17
These conclusions are not new. Area specialists and other scholars have long cited these positive 
exceptions for their unexpected accomplishments in reducing poverty without economic growth and these 
extreme cases for their achievements in increasing the income of the poor. Nevertheless, a point often lost 
is that there are multiple paths to reduce poverty and multiple ways to exacerbate it. This brief survey 
represents an initial exploration into these issues, a step that is incomplete. First, the database adopted for 
these exercises, though covering the experiences of an extensive range of countries over the past several 
decades, understandably omits many countries – especially the poorest, for which data are difficult to 
obtain. Moreover, limitations in space, time and expertise prevent the extensive exploration required to 
establish strong causal linkages between potential factors and the end result. In this article for example, 
some exceptional and extreme cases were not analyzed, while the analysis for others was by necessity 
brief. Nevertheless, for many of these cases, distinct policies and strategies implemented over specific 
time periods can be identified as plausible candidate causes. For instance, Peru’s case was based on a 
special set of radical redistributive policies implemented by a left-leaning administration that resulted in a 
pattern that violated the general relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction. Despite the 
need for additional work to trace causal connections between these policies and the economic effects, we 
can initially suggest that in many cases, government strategies and policies shaped and influenced the 
degree of economic growth and poverty reduction, as well as the degree to which economic growth (or 
the lack thereof) influenced poverty rates. It is insufficient to look at economic factors alone. 
Understanding the political and social contexts is crucial.  
In most cases, the factors that were tentatively identified in this paper demand further attention. 
Because these factors are not unique, they are unlikely by themselves to explain these relatively unusual 
outcomes. For instance, while some of the positive exceptions are Scandinavian social democracies 
(Finland and Norway), identifying them as such is insufficient to explain these performances. Since many 
social democracies (e.g., Sweden and Denmark) and many time periods in Norway and Finland were not 
exceptional under this study’s strict criteria, it is not possible that these countries’ status as social 
democracies alone account for their exceptional results. Similarly, some countries that restructured their   18
economies achieved strikingly different results, with some (e.g., Costa Rica) becoming positive 
exceptions and others (e.g., Mali) becoming negative ones. Crucially, most countries that implemented 
structural adjustment programs were not exceptions in either direction – thus restructuring by itself is 
unable to explain either type of exceptional result. Identifying which factors, in combination with 
restructuring (assuming that structural adjustment is involved at all), led to these puzzling results requires 
a closer comparative review of the cases. Through qualitative methods, we can discover the complex 
array of factors, whether political, economic, social, geographic, demographic or otherwise, that 
interacted to produce these results.
xix  
Some might argue that, valid as these conclusions might be in the short term, fewer exceptions will 
appear in the long term because the disjuncture between economic growth and poverty reduction narrows 
over time. For instance, following the principles behind Kuznets’s inverted “U” (which predicts that, due 
to varied responses from different economic sectors under economic growth, income inequality will 
initially increase for a time as the economy grows, before subsequently diminishing), we would expect 
that “negative exceptions” could occur while growth is primarily benefiting the non-poor, until the gap 
closes over time as the benefits of growth spread, possibly even creating “positive exceptions.” Little 
empirical evidence supports Kuznets’s inverted “U” (Kanbur 2000), but even without following that strict 
pattern, growth can eventually benefit the poor. This appears to be the case with Singapore, which was an 
extreme case in one period (1973-78), a negative exception during a subsequent period (1978-1993), 
before becoming an extreme case once again.  
While this argument is plausible, many advocates of economic growth and liberal economic policies 
specifically reject “trickle-down” growth as an important mechanism for poverty reduction (e.g., Dollar 
and Kraay 2002, p. 219). Moreover, few of the cases fall into this pattern. For instance, most of the Asian 
developmental states succumbed to financial crisis that subsequently produced more inequality and an 
upright (not inverted) “U” shape. Colombia, for one, became a negative exception after – not before – it 
was a positive exception. El Salvador does show an inverted “U” pattern, but this is explained by peace 
and redistribution, not by the dynamics that Kuznets predicts. In many countries, such as China (which in   19
the 1980s showed an upright “U” pattern), the Gini index continues to grow, despite decades of growth. 
The image of a generation sacrificing for the benefit of their children is evocative, yet it is probably more 
common to see a generation of poor people toiling for national development, the benefits of which are 
skewed away from themselves and their children alike. While economic growth may someday trickle 
down to the poor, the vague promises of such future gains may be a cold comfort.  
To provide models that have increased income of the poor in the present, we have looked to a variety 
of cases, both extreme and exceptional. Of the two types, the latter is more controversial, since the 
suggestion that we scrutinize exceptions is often viewed with skepticism. Many social scientists using 
regression and other types of quantitative methods often discard residual cases as random anomalies that, 
while inconvenient, do not detract significantly from, or contribute to, the overall conclusions. Granted, 
some exceptional cases will be explained by important but uninteresting (to social scientists) factors, such 
as weather or natural disasters, which are largely out of human hands. Data errors can create other 
apparent exceptions. Furthermore, exceptions by themselves do not undermine a general relationship – to 
assert that they do falls into the trap of extreme falsificationism in which one or some exceptions 
undermine otherwise generally applicable theoretical statements. For these reasons, in the policy realm, 
we should be cautious in applying insights from such exceptions to other cases, as much damage has been 
caused by blindly following models generated in certain spheres to dissimilar situations.  
Despite these concerns, it remains possible that these unusual patterns are caused by social actors 
who did something within the political, social or economic realms that the model failed to anticipate. 
More broadly, disaggregated models of all kinds potentially produce puzzling cases that might offer 
potential guidance that nations can consider. Seeking anomalies, and understanding and explaining them, 
furthers theory, a key mission for social scientists. Theoretically, analyzing such exceptions deepens our 
understanding of the connection between economic growth and poverty reduction and the conditions 
under which this connection applies. Studying outliers opens up theoretical space, allowing us to ask: 
what other factors reduce poverty? Similarly, for policy purposes, researching countries that have defied 
the link between economic growth and poverty reduction uncovers empirical models that policymakers   20
seeking to reduce poverty can cautiously emulate, carefully adapt or consciously avoid. Such a study can 
contribute ideas to the United Nations Millennium Project’s goal of halving poverty around the globe. 
Within the variation in Dollar and Kraay’s data are clues to alternative paths to effective poverty 
reduction. Studying exceptional cases increases our knowledge on what has and has not worked (besides 
promoting economic growth) for reducing poverty. As two economists argue:  
“However, the general assertion that ‘growth is good for the poor’ is not the most 
interesting way to interpret this finding. What is interesting is to identify common 
features of positive (negative) residuals—cases where growth leads to substantially better 
(worse) poverty outcomes than predicted from global regressions. If these features can be 
linked to policies, there is a case for switching toward policies that connect the poor more 
to growth…” (Eastwood and Lipton 2000, p. 40) 
This paper reflects precisely this call for a study. Its conclusions do not undermine a basic 
conclusion: economic growth and poverty reduction are related, with the former often causing the latter. 
At the same time, in numerous cases involving tens of millions of poor people, economic growth is 
divorced from poverty rates. For negative exceptions, either heady economic growth sparked little 
poverty reduction or recessions hurt the poor significantly more than it did others. For positive 
exceptions, either the income of the poor increased despite negative growth or poverty rates declined 
without much economic growth. Similarly, the best-performing countries, as judged by increases in the 
income of the poor, can be explained by economic growth only about half the time and by fundamentally 
liberal policies only rarely.  
Although advocates of economic growth and liberal economic policies at times acknowledge the 
contingent relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction, the thrust of their arguments is 
generally less compromising.
xx Moreover, the use of aggregate data to seek solutions to poverty comes 
dangerously close to a search for a panacea, part and parcel of the discredited attempt to confront complex 
and multifaceted social issues with a covering law. There is no miracle lever – not economic growth, not   21
the market, not the state – for poverty reduction. Economic growth sometimes reduces poverty; 
sometimes, when poorly distributed, it leaves poverty untouched. Other times, when economic growth 
shifts market forces, capital and property rights against the interests of the poor, it can undermine the 
positions of the most vulnerable of society, exacerbating poverty. When economic growth does benefit 
the poor, often it is insufficient or takes a long time in coming. Nobel Lauriat Amartya Sen’s argument, 
nearly two decades old, remains true today: 
“Not merely is it the case that economic growth is a means rather than an end, it is also 
the case that for some important ends it is not a very efficient means either… It might 
well be the case that ‘money answereth all things,’ but the answer certainly comes 
slowly.” (Sen 1983, p. 754)  
More than one billion people live on less than one dollar a day, and annual poverty-related deaths exceed 
18 million (Pogge 2005). Given the contingent and sometimes long-delayed benefits of economic growth 
for the poor, the imperative of discovering alternative pathways to reduce poverty should not be doubted.  22
Bibliography 
Amsden, Alice H. 1985. "The State and Taiwan's Economic Development." In Bringing the State Back In, 
ed. P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Asian Development Bank. 2002. "Poverty Reduction in Nepal: Issues, Findings, and Approaches." 
Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Boyce, James K. 1995. "Adjustment Toward Peace: An Introduction." World Development 23 (12):2067-
77. 
Bunce, Valerie. 1999. "The Political Economy of Postsocialism." Slavic Review 58 (4):756-93. 
Chow, Kit Boey, Kee Beng Lee, Allaudeen Hameed, and Boo Chin Cheong. 1988. "Singapore Business 
Cycles." In Business Cycles in Five ASEAN Countries, India and Korea, ed. Institute of Developing 
Economies. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies. 
Coulombe, Harold, and Andrew McKay. 1996. "Modeling Determinants of Poverty in Mauritania." 
World Development 24 (6):1015-31. 
Danielson, Anders. 2001. "When Do the Poor Benefit from Growth, and Why? (Background Paper to 
Sida's Poverty Project)." Lund: Department of Economics. 
Deininger, Klaus. 1999. "Making Negotiated Land Reform Work: Initial Experience from Colombia, 
Brazil and South Africa." World Development 27 (4):651-72. 
Deininger, Klaus, Raffaella Castagnini, and Maria A. Gonzalez. 2004. "Comparing Land Reforms and 
Land Markets in Colombia: Impacts on Equity and Efficiency." Washington DC: World Bank. 
Derleth, J. William, ed. 2000. The Transition in Central and Eastern European Politics. Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Dollar, David, and Aart Kraay. 2000. "Growth Is Good for the Poor." Washington, DC: World Bank. 
———. 2002. "Growth is Good for the Poor." Journal of Economic Growth 7 (3):195-225. 
Dorner, Peter, and Herman Felstehausen. 1970. "Agrarian Reform and Employment: the Colombian 
Case." International Labor Review 102 (32):221-40.   23
Eastwood, Robert, and Michael Lipton. 2000. "Pro-Poor Growth and Pro-Growth Poverty Reduction: 
Meaning, Evidence and Policy Implications." Asian Development Review 18 (2):22-58. 
———. 2001. "Pro-Poor Growth and Pro-Growth Poverty Reduction: What Do they Mean? What Does 
the Evidence Mean? What Can Policymakers Do?" Manila: Asian Development Bank. 
Findlay, Roger W. 1972. "Ten Years of Land Reform in Colombia." Wisconsin Law Review 3:880-923. 
Findlay, Ronald, and Stanislaw Wellisz, eds. 1993. The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity and 
Growth: Five Small Open Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Goertz, Gary. 2005. "Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide (Book Manuscript)." 
Gustafsson, Bjorn, and Peder J. Pedersen, eds. 2000. Poverty and Low Income in the Nordic Countries. 
Aldershot: Aldersgate. 
Hudson, Rex A., ed. 1994. Chile: A Country Study. Edited by L. o. C. Federal Research Division. 3rd ed. 
Washington DC: Library of Congress Federal Research Division. 
Huff, W.G. 1999. "Singapore's Economic Development: Four Lessons and Some Doubts." Oxford 
Development Studies 27 (1):33-55. 
IBRD. 1995. "Trinidad and Tobago Poverty and Unemployment in An Oil Based Economy." Washington 
DC: World Bank. 
Johnson, Chalmers. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Kakwani, Nanak, and Ernesto M. Pernia. 2000. "What is Pro-Poor Growth?" Asian Development Review 
18 (1):1-16. 
Kanbur, Ravi. 2000. "Income Distribution and Development." In Handbook of Income Distribution, ed. 
A. B. Atkinson and F. Bourguignon. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V. 
———. 2001. "Economic Policy, Distribution and Poverty: The Nature of Disagreements." World 
Development 29 (6):1083-94.   24
Laville, Rosabelle. 2000. "In the Politics of the Rainbow: Creoles and Civil Society in Mauritius." 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies 18 (2):277-94. 
Lee, William K.M. 2001. "The Poor in Singapore: Issues and Options." Journal of Contemporary Asia 31 
(1):57-70. 
Levy, Jonah D. 1999. "Vice into Virtue? Progressive Politics and Welfare Reform in Continental 
Europe." Politics and Society 27 (2):239-73. 
Lubker, Malte, Graham Smith, and John Weeks. 2000. "Growth and the Poor: A Comment on Dollar and 
Kraay." London: University of London, Centre for Development Policy and Research. 
———. 2002. "Growth and the Poor: A Comment on Dollar and Kraay." Journal of International 
Development 14 (5):555-71. 
McClintock, Cynthia. 1981. Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Molano, Alfredo. 2000. "A Guerilla Group's Long History." NACLA Report on the Americas 32 (2):29-
32. 
Murray, Warwick E. 2002. "The Neoliberal Inheritance: Agrarian Policy and Rural Differentiation in 
Democratic Chile." Bulletin of Latin American Research 21 (3):425-41. 
Oxfam. 2000. "Growth with Equity is Good for the Poor." London: Oxfam. 
Øyen, Else. 1996. "Poverty Research Rethought." In Poverty: a Global Review: Handbook on 
International Poverty Research, ed. E. Øyen, S. M. Miller and S. A. Samad. Oslo and Paris: 
Scandinavian University Press; UNESCO Publishing. 
Park, Albert, and Sangui Wang. 2001. "China's Poverty Statistics." China Economic Review 12 (4):384-
98. 
Peebles, Gavin, and Peter Wilson. 1996. The Singapore Economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Pogge, Thomas. 2005. "World Poverty and Human Rights." Ethics and International Affairs 19 (1):1-7. 
Puyana, Alicia. 2000. ""Dutch Disease," Macroeconomic Policies, and Rural Poverty in Colombia." 
International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 14 (1):205-33.   25
Ravallion, Martin. 2001. "Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Looking Beyond Averages." World 
Development 29 (11):1803-15. 
Republic of Yemen. 2002. "Republic of Yemen: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 2003-2005." 
Washington DC: World Bank. 
Rodriguez, Adrian G., and Stephen M. Smith. 1994. "A Comparison of Determinants of Urban, Rural and 
Farm Poverty in Costa Rica." World Development 22 (3):381-97. 
Rodrik, Dani. 2000. "Growth Versus Poverty Reduction: A Hollow Debate." Finance and Development 
37 (4):8-9. 
Roett, Riordan. 1999. Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society. Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Rozelle, Scott, Linxiu Zhang, and Jikun Huang. 2003. "China's War on Poverty: Assessing Targeting and 
the Growth Impacts of Poverty Programs." Journal of Chinese Economics and Business 1 (3):301-
17. 
Sachs, Jeffrey D. 1995. "Shock Therapy in Poland: Perspectives of Five Years." In The Tanner Lectures 
on Human Values. Salt Lake City: University of Utah. 
Sen, Amartya. 1983. "Development: Which Way Now?" The Economic Journal 93 (372):745-62. 
Taylor, Marcus. 2004. "Labor Reforms and the Contradictions of "Growth with Equity" in 
Postdictatorship Chile." Latin American Perspectives 31 (4):76-93. 
Toulmin, Camilla, Rebeca Leonard, Thea Hilhorst, and Djeneba Diarra. 2000. "Mali Poverty Profile." 
IIED's Drylands Programme. 
United Nations World Food Programme. 2005. News - Press Release [Internet] 2005 [cited September 26 
2005]. Available from 
http://www.wfp.org/english/?n=326&formCategory=Press%20Release&elemId=id2575&k=1368. 
Wade, Robert. 1993. "Managing Trade: Taiwan and South Korea as Challenges to Economics and 
Political Science." Comparative Politics 25 (2):147-67.   26
Weisbrot, Mark, Dean Baker, Robert Naiman, and Gila Neta. 2000. "Growth May be Good for the Poor - 
But are IMF and World Bank Policies Good for Growth?" Washington, DC: Center for Economic 
and Policy Research. 
White, H., and E. Anderson. 2001. "Growth Versus Distribution: Does the Pattern of Growth Matter?" 
Development Policy Review 19 (3):267-89. 
Wood, Elisabeth, and Alexander Segovia. 1995. "Macroeconomic Policy and the Salvadoran Peace 
Accords." World Development 23 (12):2079-99. 
World Bank. 1996. "Trinidad and Tobago: Macroeconomic Assessment and Review of Public Sector 
Reform and Expenditures: The Changing Role of the State." Washington DC: World Bank. 
———. 2000. Making Transition Work for Everyone: Poverty and Inequality in Europe and Central 
Asia. Washington DC: World Bank. 
———. 2001. China: Overcoming Rural Poverty. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Zafar, Ali. 2004. "What Happens When a Country Does Not Adjust to Terms of Trade Shocks? The Case 




Figure 1: GDP growth rates compared with changes in income of the poor  
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Figure 3: Multiple Paths to Poverty Reduction 
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Country Time  Period  Annual Growth of 
GDP/Capita  
Predicted annual 
change in income 
of lowest quintile 
Reported annual 
change in income 
of lowest quintile  
Residual Re
- Predicted
Cases in which reported annual change in income of lowest quintile exceeded model’s predictions 
Colombia  1964-1970  2.33%  2.08% 17.16% 15.08%
Norway 1979-1984  2.75%  2.58% 14.57% 11.99%
Finland  1962-1971  3.99%  4.05% 14.61% 10.56%
Nepal 1977-1984  -0.15% -0.86%  9.61%  10.47%
Honduras 1986-1991 -0.25%  -0.97%  8.62%  9.60%
Yemen 1992-1998  0.28%  -0.35% 8.00% 8.35%
Mauritania 1988-1993  1.72%  1.36%  9.65%  8.30%
Peru 1971-1981  0.91%  0.40%  8.51%  8.11%
Chile 1987-1992  5.14% 5.41%  13.35%  7.94%
Norway 1989-1995  2.67%  2.48% 10.26%  7.78%
El Salvador  1989-1995  2.59%  2.39%  9.51%  7.11%
France 1975-1981  2.19%  1.92% 9.01% 7.08%
Costa Rica  1977-1982  -3.41%  -4.72%  2.25%  6.97%
Cases in which reported annual change in income of lowest quintile fell below model’s predictions 
Ukraine 1988-1995  -10.96% -13.66%  -20.21% -6.55%
El Salvador  1977-1989  -1.74%  -2.73%  -9.31%  -6.58%
France 1956-1962  3.84%  3.87%  -3.07%  -6.95%
Singapore 1978-1983  5.83%  6.23%  -1.28%  -7.51%
Mali 1989-1994  -2.62%  -3.78%  -11.39%  -7.61%
Poland 1991-1996  4.83%  5.04%  -2.73%  -7.78%
Estonia 1988-1993  -8.40%  -10.63%  -18.41% -7.78%
Colombia 1970-1978  3.35%  3.29%  -4.79%  -8.08%
Dominican Rep  1984-1989  2.38%  2.15%  -6.45%  -8.59%
Brazil 1986-1993  -0.97%  -1.83%  -10.57%  -8.75%
China 1990-1995  8.71% 9.64%  0.87%  -8.77%
Bulgaria 1989-1994  -4.86%  -6.43% -16.28%  -9.85%
Puerto Rico  1963-1967  6.08%  6.53%  -4.80%  -11.33%
Russia 1988-1993  -6.43% -8.30%  -20.88%  -12.58%
 
Table 1: Exceptional cases. Sources: Dollar and Kraay (2002); author’s calculations 





Growth: Income of 
Bottom Quintile 
Rank: Growth of 
Bottom Quintile  GDP Growth 
 
Singapore 1973-1978  10.7%  5  5.4% 
Korea 1961-1966 10.2%  7  4.7% 
France 1962-1970  10.1%  8  4.5% 
Japan 1962-1967  9.8% 9  8.4% 
Taiwan 1975-1980  9.7%  10  7.6% 
Singapore 1983-1988  9.6%  13  4.2% 
Hong Kong  1981-1986  9.3%  15  4.2% 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 1976-1981  9.3%  16  5.8% 
Korea 1982-1988  9.2%  17  8.4% 
Bulgaria 1984-1989  9.2%  18  7.8% 
Gabon 1960-1975  9.0% 20  7.7% 
Japan 1967-1972  8.6%  22  7.8% 
Mauritius 1986-1991  8.4%  24  5.8% 
Table 2: 25 cases with most rapid growth of income of bottom quintile, excluding exceptional 
countries. Sources: Dollar and Kraay (2002); author’s calculations. 
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i Although most researchers concede that the economic growth’s connection with poverty reduction is to 
some degree contingent, most academics, including skeptics such as Dani Rodrik (2000) and Oxfam 
(2000), also agree that economic growth is often helpful – even necessary – for reducing poverty. This 
consensus drives economist Ravi Kanbur, who studies the debate surrounding economic growth and 
poverty reduction, to label the debate over the need for economic growth a “red herring,” concluding, 
“The word ‘growth’ was immediately divisive … with [one group] accusing [the second] of being ‘anti-
growth,’ and [the second group] characterizing [the first] as holding the view that ‘growth is everything.’ 
In fact, there is more agreement here than meets the eye, and the rhetoric of both groups stands in the way 
of seeing the degree of agreement that does exist” (Kanbur 2001). 
ii The conclusions are limited. Even if accepted at face value, Dollar and Kraay’s results do not indicate 
that economic growth reduces either absolute poverty, since they define poverty relatively within each 
country, or inequality, since positive overall income growth actually exacerbates absolute inequality if it 
varies one-to-one with the income of the poor (Ravallion 2001; Eastwood and Lipton 2001). 
iii Because the resulting periods do not correspond to changes in administrations or policies, the particular 
patterns of years impede analysis of the political causes of changes. This problem plagues the authors’ 
attempts to assign variables to factors such as degree of democracy and trade openness, as well as my 
attempt to analyze why some cases were exceptions. 
iv Such criticisms include: the dataset contains implausible changes in income for some countries, 
excludes the poorest countries and most time periods over the past 45 years, includes too much variation 
in the number of observations for each country and likely depends on data from one or two countries 
(Weisbrot et al. 2000; Eastwood and Lipton 2001; Lubker et al. 2000). 
v For instance, the emergence of Yemen (1992-1998) and Nepal (1977-1984) as positive exceptions 
(explained below) is inconsistent with other research. During the identified period, Yemen suffered a 
protracted and severe recession resulting in rising unemployment and inflation. The poor likely suffered   33
                                                                                                                                                             
from lost job opportunities, and from declining remittances caused by the return of overseas workers 
during the first Gulf War. The unsustainable increase in government spending, moreover, more likely 
benefited civil servants and segments of the population other than the poorest quintile. Whether the 1995 
reform program – which enhanced infrastructure and improved health – can account for the reported 
increase in income of the poor requires further study (Republic of Yemen 2002). Similarly, one study 
(Asian Development Bank 2002) suggests, in contrast to Dollar and Kraay’s data, that rural poverty in 
Nepal increased markedly from the mid-1970s and through the 1977-1984 period, although at least one 
NGO contests these statistics.  
vi In the statistics used here (as in Dollar and Kraay’s article), economic growth is measured in changes in 
per capita GDP, expressed as an average rate over a particular period of at least five years. Income growth 
of the poorest quintile is also expressed as average annual changes. Some of the samples measure 
incomes through consumption, as explained in Dollar and Kraay (2002).  
vii Since Dollar and Kraay’s data, though extensive, are partial and exclude many poor countries, this 
likely underestimates the extent that such exceptions occurred in the world. 
viii The effect of land reform on poverty in Colombia is contested. Some analysts, pointing out that the 
Gini coefficient for land holdings declined only modestly from .87 to .84 between the 1960s and 1990 
(Deininger 1999), argue that land reform failed to make land holdings more equitable, in part because 
most of these new land titles were taken not from large farms but from public land (Dorner and 
Felstehausen 1970). However, the date range of these analyses may be too broad to determine the effect 
of the program, as land reform was rolled back in the early 1970s. Subsequent research shows that the 
increase in the concentration of land holdings, as Deininger (2004) subsequently noted, occurred after this 
rollback, primarily between the mid-1980s and 1990s when the share of land controlled by larger farms 
increased from 46 percent to 54 percent between 1984 and 1997.   34
                                                                                                                                                             
ix Urban-to-rural migration increased substantially during this period, probably contributing to these rates 
of growth. However, the rate of increase in urban population, which greatly outpaced expansion in urban 
jobs, limited the benefit of migration for the income of poorest quintile (Dorner and Felstehausen 1970). 
x Whereas in 1989, remittances from relatives made up 3.5 percent of the country’s GDP, after the peace 
accord was signed remittances increased rapidly, reaching US$686 million, or 8.1 percent of GDP, in 
1992, and US$870 million, or 9.7 percent of GDP, in 1994 (Wood and Segovia 1995). 
xi This contrasts with the spirit of Dollar and Kraay’s argument that liberal policies lead to economic 
growth that reduces poverty. The authors also argue that liberal policies are not just distribution neutral, 
but can tilt growth in favor of the poor (e.g., Chart 2, p. 213, shows that reducing government expenditure 
and inflation – two policies that the authors claim are part of neoliberal policies – in addition to promoting 
economic growth, have the additional effect of distributing the benefits of growth to the poorest quintile). 
Thus, the authors would likely expect that implementation of a liberal agenda should also reduce poverty 
independently of economic growth, an argument supported by the cases of Costa Rica and Colombia.  
xii Other studies conclude that poverty in Costa Rica increased between 1977 and 1983 from 16.1 percent 
to 30.5 percent (Rodriguez and Smith 1994). This result does not necessarily contradict Dollar and 
Kraay’s data since the poorest quintile’s income could increase even as the poverty rate rises.  
xiii Jeffrey Sachs suggested that “Poland – the basket case of Eastern Europe in 1989 – has been the most 
dramatic illustration of the success of radical economic reforms” (Sachs 1995, p. 275).  
xiv This is consistent with poverty rates published by the World Bank that suggest that Poland’s poverty 
rates were higher in 1998 than they were in 1991 (World Bank 2000).  
xv In addition, there are significant provincial variations in poverty reduction within the various regions of 
China, as well as in many other large, decentralized countries such as India and Brazil. 
xvi Between 1973 and 1978, the income of the poor in Singapore increased more than 10 percent, 
compared to an average per capita growth rate of 5.4 percent, while between 1983 and 1988, the income 
of the poor increased 9.6 percent, based on an average annual per capita GDP growth of 4.2 percent.   35
                                                                                                                                                             
These two periods do not qualify as exceptions under the strict guidelines adopted for this study, yet they 
do indicate that the weak linkage between economic growth and poverty reduction in Singapore. 
xvii An analysis of 25 extreme cases in the other direction (cases that performed the worst in terms of 
income for the poor) are not analyzed. First, the conclusion that liberal policies spark growth in both GDP 
and incomes of the poor is more central to this discussion than the conclusion that a lack of liberal 
policies will prevent this result. Second, the dataset excludes many of the poorest countries that lack 
sufficient data for inclusion, a problem that primarily applies to the worst performing countries. Briefly, 
the 25 extreme negative cases include 10 of the 13 negative exceptions (all except France, Poland and 
Singapore). Six are Eastern European shock therapy cases (Moldova, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, 
Uzbekistan, Lithuania and Russia). Five Latin American (The Bahamas (1970-1975), Guatemala (1979-
1987), Peru (1981-1986 and 1986-1994) and Panama (1979-1989)); three African (Nigeria (1985-1991), 
Sierra Leone (1968-1989) and Zimbabwe (1991-1996)); and one Middle Eastern (Jordan (1986-1991)) 
case round out the list.  
xviii Trinidad and Tobago’s oil industry during the mid-1990s employed only four percent of the labor 
force, although the industry accounted for more than a quarter of the country’s GDP and 70 percent of its 
merchandise exports (World Bank 1996).  
xix It might be possible to reduce these factors, once they are identified, to statistical variables and to re-
introduce them into the regression to see if they can explain more about these cases. Given the contingent 
nature of development, however, this might not work.   
xx Dollar and Kraay, for instance, both recognize that economic growth sometimes reduces poverty while 
simultaneously claiming a one-to-one relationship between economic growth and poverty reduction. This 
is not inconsistent, for they refer to the slope of the regression line, not the variation within the actual 
points. Still, this conclusion can be unintentionally deceptive. In 10 percent of Dollar and Kraay’s cases, 
the link between economic growth and poverty reduction was statistically likely to be invalid. 
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